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PREFACE
This report presents the results of an investigation by ORI, Inc. of
pilot error related accidents in helicopters to identify areas in '_hich ne_
technology could reduce or eliminate the underlying cause of the human errors.
ORI dre;_ from the aircraft accident data base at the U.S. Army Safety Center
at Fort Rucker, Alabama, as the source of data on helicopter accidents.
This study _as performed by ORI, Inc. as Task 16 of NASA Contract
NASW 3554. The report is intended for use by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration in preliminary planning of aeronautical research.
The authors gratefully ackno_lledge the very helpful assistance of the
U.S. Army Safety Center in providing access to the Army's aircraft accident
data base as a source of data for this study. The authors also _lant to thank
Hr. Les Kerfoot and Hr. Paul Stringer for their many helpful suggestions in
the preparation of this report.
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SUMMARY
The pilot is cited as a cause or related factor in most rotorcraft
accidents. This report presents an investigation of pilot error related
accidents in helicopters to identify areas "_ere the application of new
technology could contribute to preventing or reducing the severity of such
accidents. The study _as conducted by ORI, Inc. under contract _¢ith the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)as an input to their
aeronautical research planning activities.
At the request of NASA,the U.S. ArmySafety Center (USASC)provided
access to Army aircraft accident investigation reports for helicopter accidents
in _lhich humanerror _as determined to be a cause factor. With the cooperation
of the USASCstaff, ORI personnel performed an in-depth review1of llO accident
investigation reports, _ich 14erea randomly selected sample of 72 percent of
the major (Classes A and B) helicopter mishaps attributed to pilot error during
fiscal years 1981-1983. The aggregated cost estimates for the accidents
included in the study exceeded$62 million and involved 33 fatalities and
155 non-fatal injuries. The data base was handled in a manner that assured
that all non-technical accident specifics considered to be sensitive informa-
tion _lere omitted.
Army aircraft accident records _ere used for the study for three major
reasons. First, the combination of the Army's accident investigative methods
and extensive use of helicopters provided an aircraft accident data base
involving a wide variety of missions. These missions were performed largely
by single-rotor helicopters under l O,O00pounds gross weight, and the data
_re considered to be sufficiently generic to allow someinsight into civil as
well as military helicopter accidents.
Second, the Army data base could provide a wide range of events for
analysis since human error _¢as cited by the USASC as a factor in most (75
percent) Army aircraft mishaps.
Third, other investigators had not found the data base on civil
helicopter accidents to contain information of sufficient detail to adequately
assess technology needs.
In conducting this study, ORI selected a task element analytical
approach. This approach involved reviekl of the accident records on a case-by-
case basis to examine the human task errors and sequence of events for each
mishap and assess applicable technology implications. Since more than one
technology need could be identified for some mishaps, they were classified as
primary and secondary to facilitate aggregation by common groupings. The
distribution by primary groupings is shmln in Figure I.
AREASOFTECHNOLOGYNEEDS
NO APPARENTTECHNOLOGYIMPLICATIONS
ALTERNATIVESTO THETAILROTOR
ADVANCEDFLIGHTSIMULATORS
ADVANCEDFLIGHTCONTROLSANDDISPLAYS
OBSTRUCTIONDETECTION
AUTOMATEDMONITORINGANDDIAGNOSTICSYSTEMS
CONTINGENCYPOWER
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FIGURE I. BAR GRAPH OF PERCENTAGE OF MISHAPS
AGGREGATED BY TECHNOLOGY IMPLICATIONS
All of the technology implications identified from revim_ of the llO
accident records fall into one or more of the follm_ing groups:
• No apparent technology implications. The sequence of events
leading to the mishap occurred in such a _lay that no apparent
applications of advanced technology could reasonably be
identified for a pilot-controlled aircraft.
o
3.
4.
Vehicle design alternatives for eliminating the tail rotor.
Advanced flight simulators for pilot proficiency training.
Advanced flight control and display systems to reduce pilot
workload for aircraft control.
. Obstruction detection devices to enhance human capability and
reduce or eliminate dependence on human vision for detection,
identification, and determination of distance•
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• Automated monitoring and diagnostic systems to aid the pilot in
monitoring flight-critical systems, reduce cockpit instrument
scan, and provide diagnostic information on conditions affecting
aircraft performance (e.g., po_mr required versus po_er
available, trends in engine parameters, impending failure/
malfunction warning, etc.).
G Contingency po_ler capabilities for short use in situations _ere
power demands required to save the aircraft exceed the rated
pm_er available.
It is recognized that product improvements using current technology
can meet in various aspects some of the needs listed above, but it is apparent
existing technology cannot resolve the full scope of all of these needs•
Technology areas in ;lhich there appears to be a need for ne_ or increased
emphasis include:
a• Vehicle designs _ich eliminate or significantly reduce the
hazards of the tail rotor.
bl Advanced flight simulators for pilot training in emergency
procedures.
c. Advanced flight control and display systems•
d. Obstruction detection devices.
e. Automated monitoring and diagnostic systems•
f. Contingency power capabilities•
Based on the results of the revie_i and analysis discussed in the
report, the follo_¢ing recommendations are made for NASA consideration:
l • NASA examine research activities to plan specific tasks for
advancing technologies identified in this report which can, if
applied, substantially reduce pilot error as a cause factor in
helicopter accidents and provide, as a benefit, the savings to
be achieved by reducing accident costs•
• NASA, in coordination with the U.S. Army, investigate the human
factors aspect of pilot techniques _ich may involve attempts to
kno_ingly operate an aircraft outside the design flight profile
capabilities of the aircraft.
• NASA, in coordination _ith the FAA, military services, and civil
helicopter users, establish a task force to investigate the
relationships bet;_een required pilot _mrkload and human error as
a cause factor in helicopter accidents.
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I. INTRODUCTION
According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the U.S.
active civil helicopter fleet has increased since 1960 at an average annual
gro_th rate of 12.5 percent. This growling pervasiveness of civil rotorcraft
usage and concern for the rate of occurrence of accidents had prompted the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to conduct a special study of
rotorcraft accidents, i The NTSB study found that the pilot is a major factor
in rotorcraft accidents. 2 The NTSB cited the pilot as a cause or related
factor in more than 64 percent of the 889 accidents reviewed.
In May 1984, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), requested that ORI, Inc. investigate pilot error related accidents in
helicopters to identify those areas _here new technology could have been a
contributing factor for avoiding or reducing the severity of the accident.
This effort _as initiated to assist NASA in their aeronautical research
planning activities.
Discussions ;_ith the sponsors and participants in an FAA-contracted
study indicated that a review1 of the accidents records in the NTSB data base
on helicopter accidents v_uld not provide sufficient detailed information on
specific events to assess the technology implications of pilot error related
accidents. As an alternative, ORI proposed that the U.S. Army's data base on
helicopter accidents be used for the study if sufficient detailed information
could be made available. The U.S. Army and civil helicopter fleets are
comprised mostly of single-rotor helicopters l_ith gross _eights of less than
lO, O00 pounds. Several of the more widely used models are similar in design
(e.g., Bell 206A Jet-Ranger and OH-58A), have similar flight instruments, and
involve comparable pilot functions for most phases of flight. An analysis by
the U.S. Army Safety Center (USASC) staff of U.S. Army aircraft accidents from
fiscal years 1978 to 1982 shows that human error was the cause factor in 75
iRotorcraft 14aster Plan, Baseline Report Revision No. l, Federal Aviation
Administration, May 1983.
2NTSB Special Study, "Review of Rotorcraft Accidents, 1977-1979,"
NTSB-AAS-SI-I, National Transportation Safety Board, WAshington, D.C.,
August 1981.
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percent of the major aircraft accidents experienced by the U.S. Army3 and
hence _muld provide a suitable data base for the ORI analysis.
At the request of NASA, the Commander, U.S. Army Safety Center, Fort
Rucker, Alabama, granted permission for the ORI team to visit the U.S. Army
Safety Center (USASC) and review aviation accident investigation reports to
determine the nature of the data available on helicopter accidents. A prelim-
inary visit to Fort Rucker and discussions _lith USASC personnel indicated that
sufficient documentation _as available in the USASC data base to support an
in-depth analysis of the technology implications involved in pilot error
related accidents.
With the cooperation of the USASC staff, ORI personnel performed an
in-depth review of llO accident investigation reports selected randomly from
the 153 Class A and B helicopter pilot error mishaps which occurred during the
fiscal years 1981-1983 time period. Data forms were prepared to list pertinent
information concerning each mishap and an initial assessment made of technology
implications of the human error aspects of the accident. This information _las
then summarized by mishap reference numbers on spreadsheets for further
analysis and aggregation into areas of technology needs _lhich, if advances in
technology _¢ere applied, appeared to have the most promise for reducing or
eliminating human error as a cause factor in helicopter accidents. Table l
presents an overview of the results of review.
TABLE l
sUr_ARY OF HELICOPTER PILOT ERROR ACCIDENTS
AGGREGATED BY AREAS OF TECHNOLOGY NEEDS
Areasof TechnologyNeeds
NoApparentTechnologyImplications
Alternativesto theTail Rotor
AdvancedFlightSimulators
AdvancedFlightControlsandDisplays
ObstructionDetection
AutomatedMonitoringandDiagnosticSystems
ContingencyPower
Numberof
Mishaps
5
6
21
25
20
29
4
Numberof
Fatalities
0
0
5
8
13
7
0
Numberof
Injuries
Non-Fatal
15
8
17
23
42
41
9
TotalsforRecordsReviewed* 110 33 155
CostEstimates
Amount Percent
$ 5,828,440 9.3%
1,768,799 2.8
13,216,408 21.1
15,394,824 24.6
11,952,376 19.1
12,022,725 19.2
2,446,922 3.9
$62,630,494 100.0
* Recordsreviewedincludeda randomlyselectedsampleof 72 percentof the ClassA and B helicopter
mishapsattributedtopiloterrorduringfiscalyears1981-1983
3Reeder, M.J., et al., "Investigation, Reporting and Analysis of U.S. Army
Aircraft Accidents," Paper Reprinted from AGARD Conference Proceedings
No. 347, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Section II of this report presents a description of the source of
data and the forms used for the ORI review. The analysis of the data and
assessment of technology needs are presented in the next t_o sections of the
report. Section V presents a comparison of the technology needs with ongoing
and planned research and technology activities and proposes areas for new
technology. The final section presents ORI's conclusions and recommendations.
This study effort was performed by ORI, Inc. as Task 16 of NASA
Contract NASW 3554.
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II. DISCUSSIONOFDATASOURCE
The data base selected for this investigation of pilot error related
accidents in helicopters is comprised of Technical Reports of U.S. Army Air-
craft Accidents for helicopter mishaps occurring in fiscal years 1981, 1982,
and 1983. In support of the objective of this NASA-sponsored analysis, the
U.S. Army Safety Center provided access to Army records for helicopter acci-
dents in _lhich human error ,¢as determined to be a cause factor.
Army aircraft accident investigation reports are prepared and safe-
guarded in accordance _ith Army Regulation 385-40, "Accident Reporting and
Records." The reports are comprised of a series of data forms (DA Forms
2397-R series) and attachments prepared by the accident investigation board
assigned to investigate a specific mishap. For serious accidents _lhich
involve loss of life, disabling injuries, or extensive damage to aircraft or
property, a minimum of four investigators are appointed to the accident board.
At least two board members must be Army Aviators on flying status, one must be
a medical officer, and the other must be an aircraft maintenance officer.
Other technical skills may be appointed to the board as required to carry out
the investigation.
Army accident records were used for the study for three major reasons.
First, the U.S. Army operates an extensive fleet of helicopters for a _ide
variety of missions. The Army's aircraft accident investigative methods
therefore tend to focus on acquiring and documenting information on helicopter
mishaps _ich can be used to resolve human errors, material failures, and
environmental factors leading to accidents. The combination of these factors
_)uld help to assure that the myriad uses of helicopters in the military as
well as the civilian sector _ould be adequately represented in the data base.
Second, the Army experienced an average of 91 major accidents per
year from fiscal years 1978-1982 and a substantial portion (75 percent) of
these accidents ;_ere attributed to human error at an estimated average cost of
$27.6 million per year. 4 This fairly large sample size would present a _lide
range of events for analysis. By revie_fing a sufficiently large sample, it
_as felt that human error accident trends, if any, _ould become more readily
evident.
4Reeder, M.J., Op. Cit., p. l-l.
Third, the accident data base on civil helicopter accidents _as not
found by other investigators to contain information of sufficient detail to
assess technology needs.
An ORI team _iorked on-site at the Fort Rucker facility for two weeks
to analyze the events and technology implications of individual case records.
During this period, the team reviewed llO pilot error accident records randomly
selected from available reports on Class A and Class B accidents. The revie_
covered about 72 percent of the Class A and B mishaps attributed to pilot
error for fiscal years 1981-1983. From those selected, 36 occurred in fiscal
year 1981, 43 in 1982, and 30 in 1983. Sixty-seven percent _¢ere Class A and
33 percent were Class B accidents. As defined by the Army, Class A accidents
are those that result in a fatality or permanent total disability to an
individual, or total loss of an airframe, or property damage and injury costs
_(hich exceed $500,000. Class B accidents are those that result in hospitali-
zation of 5 or more persons, or one or more permanent partial disabling
injuries, or property damage and injury costs bet_men $I00,000 and $500,000.
The total cost estimate of the II0 mishaps considered in the reviell was
$62,630,494.
Review of the II0 case records at Fort Rucker focused initially on
Accident Board findings and detailed descriptions of accident sequence of
events. Examination of photographs of crash sites and post-crash conditions
of helicopters was very useful in placing accident events in their proper and
understandable perspective. Additional information derived from the mishap
reports included type of accident, operating _leight, mission, phase of
operation, time of day (day, night, dusk), type of flight clearance, terrain
conditions, pilot experience, type of accident events, and related materiel
mal functions.
A sample of the data forms used to guide data acquisition for the
study is sho_m in the Appendix. The forms _mre derived from Department of the
Army Pamphlet 385-95 on "Safety, Aircraft Accident Investigation and Report-
ing," _¢ith some modifications to omit sensitive information, such as specific
references to persons, operational units, location, and date of individual
events. To further safeguard the sensitive aspects of Army records, the ORI
team assigned its o_m reference numbers to each modified data form, _ith
traceability retained only by the U.S. Army Safety Center.
The modified data acquisition forms were used to assemble information
in spreadsheet format for comparative analysis and aggregation of technology
needs. The data forms for individual mishaps were then destroyed to further
protect Army control over the source of the data.
I0
III. DATABASEANALYSIS
All of the information derived from the mishap reports _¢asanalyzed
to assess facts, conditions, and circumstances that could contribute to deter-
mining technology needs. The results of this data base analysis are discussed
in this section of the report.
In considering the applicability of technology needs to civilian and
military uses of helicopters, it is important to note that virtually all of
the accidents revielCed involved flight operations _¢ith at least two crew
members. The co-pilot, or in somecases an instructor pilot, _¢asat least
available to provide assistance in areas such as determining visual cues,
monitoring instruments and avoiding obstacles. Suchmay not be the case in
certain civilian applications _ere the entire _orkload may be vested _ith the
pilot as the sole cre_1 member.
"_ost (85 percent) of the mishaps occurred on flights operating under
visual flight rules on local flight clearances; the other mishaps occurred on
itinerant flights under visual flight rules. Weather conditions _lere deter-
mined to be a contributing factor by the investigative boards in less than II
percent of the mishaps. A low rate of occurrence (16.7 percent) of post-crash
fires _as also noted, _¢hich may be attributed to extensive use of crash_¢orthy
fuel cells in Army aircraft.
Table 2 summarizes the mishaps by aircraft type, time of day (light
conditions), and other significant circumstances or events pertinent to
assessing technology needs. The distribution of mishaps by aircraft type
appears to be primarily influenced by the composition of the Arn!y helicopter
fleet. Although low visibility conditions at night or dusk had an influence
on some mishap events, most (76.4 percent) of the accidents occurred during
daylight hours.
Over one-third of the mishaps involved circumstances or significant
events summarized in the table. About 17 percent occurred during practice
autorotations and simulated emergencies during pilot proficiency training
flights. This suggests a potential need for using advanced flight simulators
for flight proficiency training. In-flight equipment malfunctions led to
improper pilot actions in 9 percent of the mishaps. Such events indicate a
need for improvements in monitoring and diagnostic capabilities for flight-
critical systems. In addition, those pilot errors (7.3 percent) resulting
from unexpected instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) highlight a need to
further improve the pilot's flight management capabilities by applying advanced
technology in flight control and display systems.
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TABLE 2
HELICOPTER ACCIDENTS BY AIRCRAFT TYPE,
TIME OF DAY AND SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
Num_mclr
Aircraft of
Type Mishaps
UH-1 44
OH-58 30
AH-I 19
CH-47 7
UH-60 4
O11-6 4
CH-54 I
TH-55 1
Tolmlll 110
Time of Day
Day Night Dusk
34 9 1
26 2 2
12 7 0
6 1 0
2 2 0
2 1 1
1 0 0
1 0 0
84 22 4
Significant Events
Equipment
Malfunctions
Slmulatsd
Emergencies
(Power Loss)
Practice
Autorotalk)ns
10 6 13 8
Inadverlenl
IMC
The distribution of mishaps by type of mission and pilot experience
level in terms of rotary wing flying hours is shown in Table 3 below. The
flight hours for the crew member directly involved in the human error causing
the mishaps was used in this analysis. The lowest experience level (0-200)
group is considered to be in a "school environment" where their actions are
closely monitored and supervised. Conversely, those pilots with over 1,500
hours rotary wing time tend to be the pilots in command and/or instructor
pilots. The distribution of mishaps in Table 3 by type of mission and pilot
time probably reflects flight time exposure, but specific data for investi-
gating that type of correlation was not available for analysis. A study by
NTSB of civil rotorcraft accidents shows that as many as two-thirds of the
pilots involved in civil rotorcraft accidents were flying in a professional
capacity. 5 Such statistics indicate that flight experience and pilot
qualifications do not provide an adequate means in themselves for eliminating
human error as a cause factor in rotorcraft accidents.
TABLE 3
HELICOPTER ACCIDENTS BY TYPE OF MISSION AND PILOT TIME
TyI_ of Mission
Fit. Proficiency Training
Tacllcel Training
Secvk:e
Maintenance Checks
Search end Rescue
SummMlon of Mishaps
Pilot Time In Hours
Summ_lo_
0- 201- 501- 1001- 1501- 2001- Over of
200 500 1000 1S00 2000 3000 3000 Mlsheps
5 6 10 4 2 6 6 39
0 15 5 2 2 2 1 27
0 11 15 0 2 3 4 35
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 5
0 0 1 1 0 2 0 4
5 33 32 8 6 14 12 110
SNTSB Special Study, Op. Cit., p. 15.
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As shown in Table 4, over half of the mishaps involved collisions
with obstacles (29 percent) and collisions with ground (27 percent), which
includes hard contact at termination of an autorotation and powered landing.
This indicates that human vision may be inadequate for detecting obstacles to
safe flight and determining closure rates with the ground. The relative high
level of mishaps occurring during low level flight, hover operations and auto-
rotations further indicate that the human operator needs assistance to safely
control helicopter operations near the ground.
TABLE 4
HELICOPTER ACCIDENTS BY ACCIDENT TYPE AND PHASE OF OPERATION
Phase of Operation
Accident Type
Roll Over I 3
Collision WIU_
Aircraft In Air
Aircraft On Ground 2
Collision With
Ground 1 3
Water
ColUsion With Obstacles:
Wires 1
Poles 2
Trees S
Others (fence, rocks, etc.) 1
Rotor Strike on Fuselage 1 1
Loss Tail Rotor 1
Effectiveness
Total Mishaps 1 4 17
F-
4{
4 3
I I
1 3 1 3 2 5 8
1 1
1 4 1 2
1 6 1 2 1
2 1 1
3 4
3 1 5 6 3
1 3 6 5 17 11 4 10 20 11
I--
2 13
2
I 3
3 30
2
9
2
18
3
9
19
110
This brief analysis of Army helicopter accidents indicates several
areas in which technology can be applied to reduce human error as a contribut-
ing cause of helicopter accidents. Specifically, these areas include advanced
flight control and display systems, advanced monitoring and diagnostic systems,
and advanced flight simulators for flight proficiency training. Evidence
indicates that too much dependence may have been placed upon the human pilot
to perform a complex set of functions in order to fully exploit the unique
operational capabilities of the helicopter. The first two technology needs,
if integrated into the vehicle design with adequate man-machine interfaces,
could improve the pilot's flight management capabilities to handle necessary
human tasks in critical flight situations. Advance flight simulators could be
used to achieve and maintain flight proficiency skill levels while reducing
the risk of damage to the aircraft and, importantly, reducing associated
injuries and fatalities without damaging perfectly good aircraft which can be
used for other missions.
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The analysis of accident statistics and data on pilots, aircraft and
the operating environment provides a macro approach for assessing factors
affecting aircraft safety. In order to provide more insight into the circum-
stances and events which led to each mishap, 0RI selected a task element
analytical approach. This approach involved review of the accident records
on a case-by-case basis to examine the humantask errors and sequence of
events for each mishap. This methodology permitted the analyst to assess the
nature of the problems which need to be resolved and applicable technologyimplications.
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGY NEEDS
In the review1 of Army accident records, ORI assessed the technology
implications of each mishap by considering _ahat happened, the sequence of
events _lhich caused the accident to happen, and the human tasks involved in
these events. For example, an investigative board determined that an experi-
enced pilot, _hile executing a practice autorotation under dusk light condi-
tions, erred by pulling the collective pitch at an altitude that "_as too high
during deceleration, resulting in a hard landing and main rotor blade strikes
on the tail boom, which caused major aircraft damage• The standard visual
autorotation recovery technique depends on visual cues and depth perception
judgments of the pilot, aided by visual instrument scans (i.e., airspeed, rate
of descent, altimeter indicators) to make a successful landing• Thus, this
type of mishap (hard landings from a practice autorotation) suggests t_¢o types
of technology needs -- the use of advanced flight simulators for practicing
emergency procedures, and application of advanced flight control and display
technology to aid the pilot in performing aircraft control functions in
emergency as _lell as normal operating situations.
This example illustrates the task element analytical approach used by
ORI on a case-by-case basis to assess areas in _lhich technology could be
applied to reduce or eliminate human error related accidents. For 5 of the
mishaps (4.5 percent of the records reviewed), no apparent technology could be
identified as relevant to those specific sequence of events. One or more tech-
nology needs were identified for each of the other I05 mishaps. The technology
needs for each mishap _lere classified as primary and secondary to facilitate
grouping the mishaps by technology needs. The need ;las classed as primary if
the sequence of events indicated that the application of an advanced technology
to meet that need viould most likely have prevented the mishap• Application of
advanced technology to meet secondary needs could also help to prevent the
accident and may be synergetic with the primary need.
The technology needs identified from revie_l of the sequence of events
for each of the mishaps are aggregated into seven groups. These are:
l • No apparent technology implications. The sequence of events
leading to the mishap occurred in such a _ay that no apparent
applications of advanced technology could reasonably be identi-
fied for a pilot-controlled aircraft.
2. Vehicle design alternatives for eliminating the tail rotor.
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3. Advanced flight simulators for pilot proficiency training.
. Advanced flight control and display systems to reduce pilot
•mrkload for aircraft control.
. Obstruction detection devices to enhance human capability and
reduce or eliminate dependence on human vision for detection,
identification, and determination of distance.
. Automated monitoring and diagnostic systems to aid the pilot in
monitoring flight-critical systems, reduce cockpit instrument
scan, and provide diagnostic information on conditions affecting
aircraft performance (e.g., power required versus power avail-
able, trends in engine parameters, impending failure/malfunction
_#arning, etc.).
m Contingency po_er capabilities for short use in situations where
exceptional power demands required to save the aircraft exceed
the rated po_¢er available.
The aggregation of mishaps into these seven groups is discussed belo_i.
NO APPARENT TECHNOLOGY IMPLICATIONS
Summary of r4ishaps
Number: 5 mishaps Aircraft:
(4.5 % of sample)
Injuries:
Cost Estimate:
No fatalities,
15 nonfatal.
$5,828,440
(9.3% of sample)
AH-IS (I mishap)
CH-47C (2 mishaps)
UH-IH (I mishap)
UH-60A (l mishap)
There does not appear to be any feasible advances in ne_ technology
for alleviating the human error aspects in the events involved in five mishaps
revie_ed during the study. T_) of these mishaps involved aircraft damage
resulting from pilot actions during ground taxi: in one, the Board found that
excess taxi speed resulted in loss of directional control and then actions by
the pilot to regain control resulted in a fuselage strike by the rotor blades;
in the other, the pilot determined that the aircraft had an "out-of-rig" cyclic
condition _hich caused the aft part of the fuselage to become airborne. Pilot
control reaction then resulted in fuselage impacting with the ground _ith
sufficient force to cause damage.
The other three mishaps involved loss of aircraft control during steep
turns at lovl altitudes _,¢henthe pilots attempted to execute flight maneuvers
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that exceeded the design performance limits of the aircraft. While control
limiting devices could possibly be used in the aircraft design to preclude
these types of pilot errors, such a design approach _ould probably place
unacceptable design constraints on aircraft maneuverability.
ALTERNATIVESTOTHETAIL ROTOR
Summary of 14ishaps
Number: 6 mishaps Aircraft:
(5.5% of sampl e)
Injuries : No fatalities,
8 nonfatal
Cost Estimate: $1,768,799
(2.8% of sample)
OH-58A (3 mishaps)
UH-IH (l mishap)
UH-IV (2 mishaps)
The common thread of the six accidents summarized above is that the
initial events in the accident sequences probably would not have led to an
actual Class A or B accident but for a secondary tail rotor strike. In one
case, an improperly secured flight jacket left the cabin and struck the tail
rotor system, resulting in loss of both rotor blades and the gearbox. Another
accident involved the separation of an engine co_lling _lith similar conse-
quences. The initial causal event for t_io other accidents involved abrupt
flight actions :_ich led to tail rotor damage. In one, the aircraft _as
brought to a quick stop in a nose-high attitude, causing the main rotor blades
to sever the tail rotor drive shaft. In the other, an abrupt deceleration led
to a ground strike by the tail rotor. The remaining t_a) accidents involved a
tail rotor tree strike _ile flying too low and a ground strike as a helicopter
pitched fore and aft during a reamCard taxi at a crop,dealflight pad.
Assessment of Technolo_ly Implications
The vulnerability of the tail rotor to damage from tail rotor strikes
with the ground, trees, parked aircraft, and objects departing the aircraft
during flight is a common design characteristic of the mishaps summarized
above, as _4ell as several mishaps included under other technology areas. This
suggests a technology need for seeking alternatives to the use of an exposed
tail rotor for directional control in single rotor helicopter designs.
Types of New Technolo_iy Needs
There is a technology need to develop acceptable alternatives to the
use of exposed tail rotors in helicopter system designs. Advance concept
formulation and proof-of-concept research is required to investigate alterna-
tive methods for ya_ control for eliminating the hazards of a tail rotor.
Current state-of-the-art approaches include the Bell Ring Guard, the Aerospa-
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tiale fenestron type ducted fan, the Hughes NOTAR concept, coaxial main rotors,
tandem rotors and tilt rotors. While these approaches are used in specific
aircraft designs, the conventional single rotor helicopter with an exposed
tail rotor continues as the design approach selected for most rotorcraft.
Rationale for Ne_ Technology
The tail rotor is commonly used _lith single rotor helicopter designs
to provide directional control. Although useful for such applications, exposed
tail rotors can be a hazard to personnel :_alking near the aircraft on the
ground and vulnerable to damage by contact llith solid objects. Damage to the
tail rotor seriously degrades flight control. The Public Service Helicopter
Users Workshop in July 1980 at the NASA Ames Research Center identified the
elimination of the tail rotor as a vehicle design technology need to enhance
safety.
ADVANCED FLIGHT SIMULATORS
Summary of Mishaps
Number: 21 mishaps
(19.3% of sample)
Injuries: 5 fatal, 17 nonfatal.
Cost Estimate: $13,216,408
(21.1% of sample)
Aircraft: AH-IS (4 mishaps)
TAH-IS (2 mishaps)
CH54A (l mishap)
JOH-6A (I mishap)
OH-58A (l mishap)
TH-55A (l mishap)
UH-IH (lO mishaps)
UH-60A (l mishap)
All of the mishaps included in this technology need grouping occurred
during practice autorotations (13 mishaps), simulated in-flight emergencies
(6 mishaps), or other pilot proficiency training events. The autorotation
related mishaps covered a range of circumstances. In some, the pilot seemed
to have kno_In the proper procedure to follow, but erred in improperly executing
the maneuver. For example, collective pitch _as pulled at too high or too low
an altitude, or the aircraft _as not placed in the proper alignment prior to
touchdo_m. The results _ere hard or uneven ground impacts and resultant
damage. Other mishaps involved improper choice of pilot control responses
or being in a state of confusion v_en confronted with a short response time
simulated emergency. Here, the instructor pilot either gained control of the
aircraft too late or simply could not gain sufficient control to prevent
damage. Another set of circumstances involved misjudgment of visual cues.
This typically occurred in night or dusk operations as depth perception became
distorted and the pilot _as unable to adequately judge aircraft altitude.
Intervening mal function/fai Iures in t_o instances transformed the
simulated emergencies into actual mishaps. One instance involved loss of
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power from a second engine while practicing single engine emergencyprocedures.
In the other, the engine did not respond to pilot recovery actions during a
simulated engine failure over treed terrain.
In other mishaps, the pilots erred more in the selection of location
for practicing simulated emergencies than in emergencyresponses. For example,
one mishap occurred _lhile performing a simulated engine failure in a confined
area, _hich complicated events into an unsuccessful recovery. Another mishap
occurred :lhen the toe of the helicopter skid impacted soggy lumps of sod in a
grassy landing area.
The other b_o mishaps grouped in this technology needs area _Jere
attributed to pilots with limited flight experience improperly performing
pilot proficiency training events.
Assessment of Technology/ Implications
Helicopter simulators with visual terrain references offer potential
alternatives to using aircraft for flight proficiency and basic pilot training.
Types of New Technology Needs
Develop the necessary systems technology to facilitate development
and use of practical, cost-effective helicopter simulators for pilot training
in flight procedures, techniques and responses to emergencies. A helicopter
simulation conference sponsored by the FAA in April 1984 identified many
technical problems in high-fidelity simulation that can be divided into two
primary simulator functional areas: motion and vision. 6 Another problem area
involves the acquisition of accurate data concerning the flight characteristics
of helicopters. A related technology need includes human factors research
into the cost-effectiveness of using simulators to replace aircraft for pilot
training in emergency procedures and basic pilot skills, as well as instrument
flight procedures. Another related technology need includes advances in flight
information displays to eliminate or reduce pilot dependence on visual cues to
accomplish autorotation landings.
Rationale for New Technolo_I_y
Helicopter simulators can provide a potential alternative to using
aircraft for pilot proficiency training. Advantages in using simulators
include:
a. Pilot errors made While learning basic skills and maintaining
proficiency in emergency procedures do not result in aircraft
and property damage or personnel casualties.
b. Available aircraft time can be devoted to operational use.
6Jensen, David, "The FAJ_'s Simulator Conference in Atlanta," Rotorcraft &
Win9 International, July 1984, p. 42.
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ADVANCEDFLIGHT CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS
Summary of Mishaps
Number: 25 mishaps
(22.9% of sampl e)
Injuries: 8 fatal, 23 nonfatal.
Cost Estimate: $I 5,394,824
(24.6% of sample)
Ai rcraft: AH-IS (4 mishaps)
FAH-IS (2 mishaps)
AH-IG (l mishap)
OH-6A (l mishap)
OH-58A (7 mishaps)
UH-IH (8 mishaps)
UH-IM (l mishap)
UH-60A (l mishap)
Most of the 25 mishaps grouped in this technology needs area involved
some combination of adverse environmental condition (fog, dust, sno_, etc.)
or terrain (slope, mountain) condition, and divided attention caused by the
adverse condition or preoccupation "¢ith some mission function (e.g., communica-
tions, etc.). The mishaps then occurred as pilots became disoriented or simply
_ere unaware that their aircraft changed from the perceived flight conditions.
The unnoticed drifting and/or descents led to impact with the ground or an
obstacle.
An understanding of the technology implications of these mishaps can
best be characterized through selected synopses of the accident sequences, as
fol lo_¢s:
Pilot experienced loss of spatial orientation during night
flight under poor visibility conditions. The aircraft _as
inadvertently placed in an unrecovered descending turn.
A change in aircraft stability occurred as the pilot conducted a
system check on the ground in a high wind condition. The air-
craft became light on its skids and rolled.
Visual references _ere lost during hover due to blowing snow.
Aircraft drift _as unnoticed, leading to a tree strike.
During landing approach, pilot flell into a dust cloud and
encountered a partial brosm-out condition. As pilot attempted
to maintain hover position, the aircraft went into an undetected
drift and struck a tree.
During attempted takeoff from a slope, pilot failed to level the
aircraft properly, resulting in dynamic roll. Pilot concentra-
tion was divided, due to concern over nearby obstacle avoidance.
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Pilot madecompensatory control inputs during flight for an
extended period with extra lCeight of a passenger and accompany-
ing equipment. Whenthe passenger was discharged, pilot did not
readjust his controls, resulting in aircraft roll on takeoff.
Pilot was preoccupied _ith other mission responsibilities during
hover and did not recognize that aircraft was in a rear,Card,
descending drift. In monitoring instruments, pilot was aware
of altitude above the ground but not tree clearance.
Assessment of Technology Implications
It appears that the effects of errors involving pilot functions and
workload can be reduced by improvements in the capabilities of the flight con-
trol system and display of flight management information. System designs v_ich
require continuous inputs by the pilot to maintain stable flight place signifi-
cant flight control workload demands on the pilot. These demands can impact
on flight safety when human errors occur because of spatial disorientation,
distractions in concentration, impulsive control movements, inadequate communi-
cations/information, misjudgments and improper decisions. The extent to ,lhich
advances in technology for flight control systems can reduce pilot workload
and the effects of human error is a consideration for enhancing flight safety.
T)_pes of New Technology Needs
There are apparent needs to assist the pilot in performing flight
control functions in the complete flight profile of the aircraft, including
cruise, hover, taxi, climb, descent, landing and takeoff; particularly for
operations in remote areas under obscured vision flight conditions. These
needs involve advances in technology for advanced flight displays and automatic
flight stability. Flight displays should be developed that provide integrated
information necessary for the particular tasks to be performed during the
various phases of flight. The advanced flight control system should be
developed such that a rotorcraft will continue to operate in stable controlled
flight, including hover and other modes as selected by the pilot, in an auto-
matic "hands-off" control condition, unless maneuver changes are introduced by
pilot inputs, flight profile programs, or sensor systems. Advance flight
control and display system needs include new technology to accomplish safe
operations under reduced vision flight conditions for all phases of operations
and to provide information on aircraft position, altitude, attitude, heading,
airspeed, track and ground speed, and flight path obstructions to safe flight.
These technology needs are perceived as flight management aids for the human
pilot who still has a major role in the overall flight mission.
Rationale for New Technology
Advances in automated flight stabilization systems can reduce pilot
_1orkload and human errors. By relieving pilots of the need to perform con-
tinuous stability control functions, they can focus attention on flight manage-
ment and decision-making functions. The revim¢ of accident records in this
analysis, as well as public service helicopter user experiences (i.e., Public
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Service Helicopter Users Workshop in July 1980) 7 indicate needs for advances
in control concepts, alI-weather capabi 1ity, mul ti-functional displays, preci-
sion location/navigation, and capabilities to operate in remote areas under
restricted visibility conditions, including landings on sloping, uneven
terrain.
OBSTRUCTION DETECTION
Summary of Mishaps
Number: 20 mishaps
(18.3% of sample)
Injuries: 13 fatal, 42 nonfatal.
Cost Estimate: $II,952,376
(Ig.l% of sample)
Aircraft: AH-IS (2 mishaps)
CH-47C (2 mishaps)
CH-47C (l mishap)
OH-6A (l mishap)
OH-58A (4 mishaps)
OH-58C (l mishap)
UH-I H (7 mishaps)
UH-IV (l mishap)
UH-60A (I mishap)
The mishaps relating to obstruction detection capabilities can be
aggregated into three types of events. These are:
a. The aircraft hit an undetected obstruction during low level
flight. Twelve (12) of the above summarized mishaps involved this type of
situation. Six (6) of these events involved wire strikes. Four (4) involved
contact with objects, such as trees or rocks, which the pilot did not see or
misjudged clearance distance. The other bao (2) mishaps involved striking an
object (fence and parked aircraft) on final approach during a low visibility
landing.
b. During ground taxi or hover operations in congested areas,
the pilot did not see or misjudged clearance distance to an obstruction
(pole, wires, parked aircraft) that was struck by main or tail rotor blades
(4 mishaps). In one instance, although another crew member was monitoring
clearance, there was miscommunication bet;leen the pilot and guide. A somewhat
similar situation involved a crew member guide for a ground taxi performing
his function inside the aircraft and passing on improper information due to
his misjudgment of distances. A third mishap occurred during a hover taxi
from a crowded ramp. Here, a crew member was monitoring clearances and was
aware that the rotor tip was closing on another aircraft, yet failed to inform
7Helicopter Technology Needs, Public Service Helicopter User's Workshop,
NASA Ames Research Center, July 14-16, 1980, Volume I - Summary, Volume II -
Appendices.
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the pilot of this fact.
contributing factor. )
(Stress was cited by the Board as a probable
c. In mid-air collisions (2 mishaps), the pilot lost visual contact
with another aircraft in a station keeping situation or did not detect a nearby
aircraft soon enough to prevent collision.
Assessment of Technology Implications
a. The technology implications for the mishaps involving undetected
obstructions pose a need for medium-range (probably less than t_ miles)
obstruction detection devices that can inform the pilot of the existence and
relative position of hazards to safe flight. Existing limitations of NVG
(night vision goggles) now being _idely used for operations at night in some
mission areas indicate a need for further development of advanced technology
in night vision enhancements.
b. The mishaps involving taxi or hover operations indicate a need
for a short-range obstruction warning system that the pilot can use to deter-
mine safe rotor clearance. Such a system could possibly be set for clearance
distances selected by the pilot to issue a _larning if rotor clearance decreased
below the selected threshold.
c. Mid-air collision mishaps indicate a need to detect the existence
and closure rate of other aircraft in the air.
Types of New Technology Needs
a. Develop advance technology in flight path situation displays
and airborne sensors for detecting obstructions to safe low altitude flight.
The airborne sensors should be capable of detecting such obstructions as power
lines, TV tm_ers and wire supports, buildings, trees, and uneven terrain
profiles at sufficient range for safe aircraft flight path direction, either
through an integrated advanced flight control system or pilot-operated con-
trols. Also, further improvements in NVG capabilities are needed to enhance
the pilot's night vision to perform cockpit functions, as well as see outside
the cockpit.
b. A method, other than human visual estimates, to alert the pilot
that rotor clearance to nearby obstructions is less than the required clearance
margin for maneuvering during hover or ground taxi operations in congested
areas.
c. A method, other than human visual detection, for airborne
collision avoidance and station keeping. The need for an airborne collision
warning and avoidance system is to alert pilots of a collision threat and
flight maneuvers required to avoid collision. The technology need for station
keeping is to assist the pilot in maintaining a safe separation distance during
formation flight. (This technology need is similar to that identified above
in paragraph b.) There is a need to investigate the use of airborne collision
avoidance equipment applications in helicopter operations for such functions
as station keeping, rendezvous, traffic control and collision avoidance, and
precise time command and control functions.
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Rationale for New Technology
In order to exploit the unique capabilities of the helicopter, there
are both civil and military mission needs for conducting flight operations at
low altitudes _hich increases the threat of collision with undetected obstruc-
tions and adds to the pilot workload. Examples of civil missions include
police surveillance, fire fighting, agricultural applications, emergency
medical services, and search and rescue. Military flights may use the terrain
environment (trees, gullies, etc.) to mask the presence of combat helicopters
from opposing forces. Such operations are often carried out in remote areas.
Ho_¢ever, helicopter rotors are susceptible to severe damage from striking
obstructions on the ground as _ll as during flight. In addition, the burden
placed on the pilot for visual detection of obstructions to safe flight and
human depth perception for determining suitable clearance for a large diameter
rotor _ile performing other tasks adds to the complexity of achieving safe
helicopter operations. Therefore, the further application of new technology
_lhich can reduce pilot _orkload and increase the margin for errors in human
performance should enhance flight safety in performing helicopter missions.
AUTOMATED f4ONITORING AND DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEMS
Summary of Mishaps
Number: 29 mishaps
(26.6% of sampl e)
Injuries: 7 fatal. 41 nonfatal.
Cost Estimate: $12,022,725
(19.2% of sample)
Ai rcraft: AH-I S (3 mishaps )
CH-47C (2 mishaps)
OH-6A (I mishap)
JOH-58A (I mishap)
OII-58A (13 mishaps)
UH-I H (8 mishaps)
UH-I V (l mishap )
Review of helicopter accidents indicates that the mishaps in this
technology need area can be grouped as follo_s:
a. Sequences of events involving actual or suspected in-flight
materiel failures in which the pilot (or crew) misinterpreted or did not
accurately diagnose the cause-and-effect relationships of a problem (i.e.,
source of noise, smoke, vibrations, tachometer fluctuations, etc.). For
example, a materiel failure in an engine transmission caused a fire, seizing
of transmission and ultimate loss of engine power. The crew, however,
misinterpreted the problem, thinking it was an engine fire, and shut down
the unaffected engine, resulting in autorotation due to total loss of po_#er.
Another instance during a ground control approach involved an RPM warning
light going on, which the crew misinterpreted as a complete engine failure.
The aircraft was placed into autorotation to land in _ater. A third instance
involved an aircraft which began to lurch. When an instrument scan revealed
nothing abnormal, the pilot assumed the source of the problem was a failure of
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the main transmission mount. The actual problem was a failure of the Stabili-
zation Control Augmentation System (SCAS).
b. Diversion of pilot attention between cockpit monitoring of flight
instruments and other _¢orkload functions (e.g., terrain/obstacle clearance,
lookout, equipment/system checks, weapons use, etc.).
c. Operations near or exceeding the operational performance limits
of the aircraft in _hich the pilot is unaware of the status of critical flight
parameters or changes in conditions affecting these parameters (e.g., relative
_ind, loss of translational lift, power available, etc.). Several mishaps in
this grouping involved loss of tail rotor effectiveness, particularly in OH-58A
aircraft (12 incidents), and inability to maintain main rotor RPM in marginal
performance conditions (5 mishaps). The loss of tail rotor effectiveness
typically involved reduction in for_¢ard airspeed in a tail ;_ind condition.
The aircraft then went into uncommanded right turns as anti-torque control _sas
lost.
Assessment of Technology Implications
The mishaps addressed in this section indicate a need for improve-
ments in technology to assist the pilot in monitoring the performance of
flight-critical systems, reduce pilot needs for continuous scanning of cockpit
instruments, and provide diagnostic information on equipment performance and
conditions affecting aircraft performance. Dependence on the use of manual
techniques for aircraft performance planning, coordinated performance of
complex flight and mission functions, and reliable diagnosis of in-flight
materiel failures appear to be inadequate for helicopter system designs.
Types of New Technology Needs
Provide advanced technology in automated system monitoring and diag-
nostic information on flight-critical systems and aircraft performance. The
integration of this technology into helicopter system designs should provide:
a. Monitoring of the status and trends in flight-critical systems
without requiring the pilot to continually scan cockpit
instruments;
b. _arning of adverse trends and impending system failures;
C. Correlated information on malfunctions in flight-critical
systems; and
do An automated diagnostic system for predicting and monitoring
aircraft performance capabilities and pouer demands to assist
the pilot in operating the aircraft within its performance
limitations.
Rationale for New Technologic,
Review of helicopter accidents indicates that an automatic aircraft
performance and limitation monitor is needed as an in-flight system to improve
the safety margin for missions involving near-limit aircraft operations.
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Furthermore, public service helicopter users expressed a stmilar technology
need at a July 1980 workshop at the NASA Ames Research Center. In addition,
such a system can reduce human error in diagnosing cause and effect relation-
ships. Sources of unusual sounds and vibrations are sometimes misinterpreted.
Warning ltghts, t_tle useful, indicate only that a problem may exist. Such
situations can lead to accidents that could have been avoided if the flight
crew had been provided better diagnostic information. Currently, information
on system status is presented to the pilot in "raw data" format that requires
ttme-consumt ng pi lot tnterpretation.
CONTINGENCY POWER
Summary of Mishaps
Number: 4 mishaps Aircraft: UH-IH (3 mishaps)
(3.6 % of sample) UH-IV (I mishap)
Injuries: No fatal ities,
9 nonfatal.
Cost Estimate: $2,446,922
(3.9% of sample)
The four mishaps included in this technology grouping all occurred
during operations in mountainous terrain. One case involved an aircraft
clearing a mountain ridge and then encountering another ridge. The pilot
initiated a climb, but the aircraft exceeded maximum torque, resulting in RPM
bleed and loss of effective control. A second case involved a search and
rescue mission along a mountain canyon. As the terrain rose rapidly in front
of the aircraft, the pilot allowed fon_ard airspeed to decrease to zero.
Engine RPM began to bleed and the aircraft began uncommanded right turns.
Effective control was lost and the aircraft crashed. Similar sequences of
events were encountered in the other b_o mishaps.
Assessment of TechnoloB_ Implications
The mishaps included in this category of technology needs involved
events in which the margin of poker available was small and the pilot encoun-
tered a flight situation in k_ich power requirements exceeded power available.
The events tended to result from inadvertent loss of translational lift in
out-of-ground effect situations at or near maximum aircraft performance.
A relevant technology need for such incidents is to provide a contingency
power source(s) of limited duration _ich the pilot can select in emergency
situations to save the aircraft. In addition to the four mishaps noted above,
a contingency power capability could possibly have prevented five of the
accidents included in the technology area for "Automated Monitoring and
Diagnostic Systems." Those five mishaps were included under a different
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grouping because the sequence of events indicated that the pilot did not knot#
that the aircraft was operating at or near the limits of available power.
For example, an aircraft t#as loaded in excess of its allowable gross weight,
but the pilot t#as unat#are of this fact. The pilot accordingly miscalculated
the amount of torque available. The pilot's approach in mountainous terrain
became shallow, resulting in an out of ground effect (OGE) hover, which the
aircraft could not maintain in its over gross ;#eight condition.
T=ypes of Ne_ Technology Needs
Develop engine technology and/or other contingency power sources for
helicopters that can be activated by the pilot for short-duration emergency
use, even though that event may require follow-up inspections, servicing or
an engine change. The objective of using contingency poller is to save the
aircraft.
Rationale for New Technology
The unique capabilities of the helicopter to perform such missions as
search and rescue in remote mountainous terrain contributes to its use in
operations near the limits of available power. Under such conditions, the
safety margin for errors in pilot techniques or capabilities to respond to
in-flight emergencies (i.e., partial power loss) is small. In those situa-
tions, a source of additional power for even a limited time period could
improve aircraft safety. The Public Service Helicopter User Workshop in July
1980 at the NASA Ames Research Center identified emergency power capabilities
as a technology need for helicopters used for public service.
MEETING THE TECHNOLOGY NEEDS
Constant improvements in technology have provided the kno_41edge base
required for growth in rotorcraft. The preceding discussions in this section
of the report have highlighted needs for advanced technology which, if applied,
could reduce or eliminate human error as a cause factor in helicopter acci-
dents. Such benefits, of course, could be a stimulus for further grol_h, if
the costs are acceptable to helicopter users. The potential cost impacts of
improvements in technoloy must be assessed with due regard for accident costs.
It is recognized that product improvements are being made by incor-
porating technology currently available _ich can meet in various aspects some
of the needs identified in this study. Examples of current technology appli-
cations included:
Multi-function displays ;
Electronic flight instrument systems ;
Digital automatic flight control systems with three-axis
stabi Iity augmentation;
Automatic navigation management systems;
Doppler track and ground speed measurements;
Improved altimeters (i.e., radar and encoding altimeters); and
Crew training simulators (i.e., UH-IH flight simulators, AH-64
Combat Mission Simulators, etc.).
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While product improvements offer potential for improving some aspects
of problems involved in pilot errors, it is apparent that existing technology
cannot resolve the full scope of identified technology needs. The next section
will compare these needs to ongoing and planned research and technology activ-
ities to determine areas _ere ne_ technology thrusts may be required.
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V. AREAS FOR NEW TECHNOLOGY
Table 5 presents a comparison of the technology needs discussed in
the preceding section with related rotorcraft technology program activities of
NASA, the military services, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
The synopses of ongoing and planned research and technology (R&T) activities
are based on a review of the 1983 ORI study comparing rotorcraft technology
programs covered in the NASA Aeronautics Program, the DoD Technology Base and
Advanced Technology budget activities, and the R&D activities of the FAA Rotor-
craft Master Plan.8 Organization as well as programmatic relationships were
considered in that comparative analysis of rotorcraft projects. Therefore, the
joint NASA/Army program activities at collocated Army laboratories and NASA
research centers are listed under the "Integrated NASA/Army" heading. There
are other NASA and Army programmatic activities which were not included under
the integrated project activities. These efforts were included under "Other
NASA Projects" and "Other DoD Projects," as applicable.
The comparison of technology needs identified in Section IV with the
focus of related ongoing rotorcraft R&T activities provides a basis for deter-
mining where new technology thrusts could benefit the further reduction or
elimination of pilot error related accidents. The focus of these new initia-
tives is presented in Table 5 under "Proposed Areas for New Technology
Activities."
eKirkland, J. T. and Simpson, W. E., Rotorcraft Research and Technology
Program Integration - 1983, TR No. 2207, Prepared under contract for the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D.C., July 1983.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS
Based upon the results of this review and analysis of aviation mishap
investigation reports of helicopter accidents attributed to human error, it is
concluded that:
l • The data base on U.S. Army aircraft accidents at the U.S. Army
Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama, does provide sufficient
documentation of helicopter accidents to identify areas in _ich
new technology could reduce or potentially eliminate human error
as a cause factor.
. There is potential for reducing helicopter accidents by providing
improvements in technology _hich _uld:
a. Enhance the pilot's ability to detect and avoid obstacles
to safe flight during low altitude and hover flight under
restricted visibility conditions.
b. Reduce tail rotor vulnerability and enhance helicopter
capabilities to operate in remote areas.
Co Enhance the pilot's ability to better determine altitude
and rate of descent during autorotation.
do Provide essential flight information within the pilot's
field of vie_i and eliminate the need to transition to
"head-in-cockpit" flight instruments during inadvertent
encounters _¢ith instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).
e. Aid the pilot during flight critical situations to avoid
confusion and perform necessary pilot functions.
fo Monitor flight-critical systems and provide early _arning
of impending system failures and malfunctions.
gl Provide information on aircraft performance capabilities
for existing operating conditions (including po_er required
and pokier available for out-of-ground-effect hover)•
h. Provide a source of contingency po_ler.
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o Technology areas in _ich there appears to be a need for new or
increased emphasis include:
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
Vehicle design (eliminate tail rotor).
Advanced flight simulators for pilot training in emergency
procedures.
Advanced flight control and display systems.
Obstruction detection devices.
Automated monitoring and diagnostic systems.
Contingency power capabilities.
J There are some helicopter accidents attributed to human error
_ich involve human actions for _ich technology applications do
not appear to be feasible for reducing or eliminating the under-
lying cause. (These actions were described in Section IV.)
. Technology exists within the current state-of-the-art _ich
could contribute to reducing human error as a cause factor in
some types of accidents (e.g., Doppler system inputs to autopilot
to maintain stable hover under low visibility conditions).
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon the results of the review and analysis, the following
recommendations are made for NASA consideration:
l , NASA/OAST examine research activities to plan specific tasks for
advancing technologies _lhich can, if applied, substantially
reduce pilot error as a cause factor in helicopter accidents.
Areas for priority emphasis should include:
a. Technology to provide alternatives to use of a tail rotor
for directional control in single rotor configurations.
b. Advanced technology in flight simulators for applications
in pilot proficiency training in emergency procedures.
C. Obstruction detection devices for use in low altitude
operations.
d. Automated monitoring and diagnostic systems to monitor
trends in flight-critical systems and provide the pilot
;_ith in-flight information on aircraft performance capa-
bilities (e.g., excess power available, tail rotor
effectiveness, etc.).
e. Contingency power capabilities for application in flight
situations _ere short-term excess power demands could
result in loss of the aircraft.
fo Advanced flight control and display systems to reduce pilot
workload in performing flight control functions and support
safe operations in both congested and remote areas under
obscured vision flight conditions.
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o NASA, in coordination with the U.S. Army, investigate human
factors aspect of pilot techniques which may involve attempts
to knowingly operate an aircraft outside the design flight
profile capabilities of the aircraft.
. NASA, in coordination with the FAA, military services, and civil
helicopter users, establish a task force to investigate the
relationships between required pilot _orkload and human error as
a cause factor in helicopter accidents.
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APPENDIX
DATA FORMS FOR TECHNICAL REPORT
OF HELICOPTER ACCIDENTS
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NYOmAULICFLUID = Q
TNANEMIISION OIL 4 f_
CARGO s []
UNOETE IqMINE O • El
12. INFLIGHT EICAPE
1, [--I EJECTION
2 r_ EAILOUT
_L _1 NOT ACCOMPL
dL r_NA
|?. CLE ARANC!
VFR • r_
IFlq 1 []
NONE = []
10& ESTIMATED C061_
ACIIT DAMAGE COE1 I
RGPJJN Mn4RE i I
r
OTNllq _ IL I
20.
• GIN CHARACTEmSTICS
_4 []MOL_*TAIN N [] FLAT
TIRIqAINI= [] _EERT
_1 rl ROLLING _ [3 WATllq
OTNEIq _ C1¥ |
INJUIqY ¢01T S
_]TOTA L LOiS
OWNE R
OWNER
OWNER
TOTAL ¢0_r THll AOq' $
TOTAL CO6T MULTIPLE ACFT EVENT IS
13. PliqE 14. PElT CIqAI_ 1• FUEL
G E] NONE iItCAPE ,• AT TAKE OFF
1. [-IINPLliQI4T OIFFICULTIEI b, AT TIME OF EMILIO.
:L r'llq=m.cp,,4_ 1. [] YES if_TllqMINATIgN
=. []OTNEIq :L [] NO
lO, IN'JUIqlEE {Number)
• OCCUPAN_ MI LITAIqY
LI FUlL
FATAL I OIIAIL- NONOIO- MIImlNG NOT
0NO AILING _qMED NJUNE[
DEAD
A S-E F-D H J
LOCAL • {3 _ OCCUPANTSOTNElq
I:. NON-OCCUPANTS NIL
ITINERANT , D _NON-OCCUPAN_OTNER
1l. MISSION I. TOTAL THIS ACFT
f. MULTIPLE ACFT EVENT
TERRAIN OF CRASH SITE (igr f _tlm smqr _ dlDJbJ
b. AT MISHAP SITE r. IUIqFACI AT MIINAP SITE
1:! I_ t.l[Vlt. 01 PIPIqEPAREO 04 ['_ ICE
[] ELO_ 0: rlsoo _s [] SNOw
m [-)SOGGY is []WATEIq
d. OSETACLEE AT HI|HAP liT|
17 [_rru_ml os []TNNEES
lo []OLOO lo []w01qss
os I-]ROCKSmOULDEmS N r-IoTHEA
21.
• PLANNED
L WHEN EMERRGENCY
OCCURRED
FLIGHT
DURATION
MR
TNE
NR
TNI
I. ACCIOENT IEOUEN¢! HR
TE IqMINATION TNS
FLIGHT DATA
PMAIE OF ALTITUDE AI iliIpEE O HEADING AIIqCIqAFT DENSITY OVIE _._,s.m
OIqENATIONE AGL kilt. KiAJI (Cmlmm) WEIGHT ALTITUDE YES NO
22 ACCIDENT CAUI_E FACTORS (J_ • "D" _ _'* in _p_lW_ M_ j'- to Mienll_ ikrMli_ _ _eMd _o_
• PERSONNEL _i FENNSONNEL _Cmm_d_
|t) F_IGHT CIqEW: DUTY (3) SUtPENVISOIqY DUTY
DUTY DUTY
DUTY (l) OTHER D t, rl'y
(2) GROUND CREW: DUTY I_ MATERIAl. FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
DUTY r,. ENVIRONMENTAl.
23. EEGUENCIE (_mimr • _ immm41_ of _leiir_let Ilqlli'Rel fll.Om OlUlt of ilmi, FIImlcy IArOll_ I_ltbl4111111m of fl/14tlLI
24. REPORT NUMBER:
MODIFIED FORM 1-R
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1. PlNDINO,E
TECHNICAL REPORT OF HELICOPTER ACCIDENT
FINDINGS OF ACCIDENT BOARD
(A tt_h _ldl_J not, If mqu_d)
2. EUMMARY OP ACCIOENT CAUSES. EYITEM INADEQUACIES ANO RECOMMI[NOATIONS
_IY_T|MeNA_)EQUA;tEI
• PERSONNEL ERROR 1. 1.
DUTY CODE I 2. 1.
TASK ERROR COOl I 3. 1.
b. PEREONNEL ERROR 1. 1.
OUTT COOE I 2. 1.
TAlK |RROR CODE [ 3 1.
r. PERSONNEL ERROR I. 1.
DUTY CODE I 2. 1.
TAlK ERROR CODE I 3. 1.
'4 MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTiON I. 1.
I 2. 1.FAILURE CODE 3 ,
e. ENVIRONMENTAL 1. 1.
ENVIRONMENTAL CODE ! 2. 1.
I 3. 1.
3. REPORT NUMBER:
REMEDIES
3.
3.
3.
3.
3,
3.
3.
3.
3.
MODIFIED FORM Z-R
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TECHNICAL REPORT OF HELICOPTER ACCIDENT
NARRATIVE
1. NAm_ATIV| ACCOUNT OF INV_ITIOATION
• REPORTNUMBER:
MODIFIED FORM 3-R
43
1. GRID:
TECHNICAL REPORT OF HELICOPTER ACCIDENT
WRECKAGE DISTRIBUTION DIAGRAM
I_'_ M_ 'OR OOUal MARKI, OliT_IIUTION OF WlqlCKAQ I, OIMFrACLII, OIIItlCI"ION OI = NORTH, WtNO OlPliCTION, WINO
VILOOTY, POIITION OP WITNII_. IT_ IUGOIITIO ICALI: 1" IGUAUI 4_ ACTUAL iCALI: 1" |QUAUI
2. REPORTNUMBER:
b
tIODIFIEDFORM ,5-R
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TECHNICAL REPORT OF HELICOPTER ACCIDENT
IN-FLIGHT OR TERRAIN IMPACT AND CRASH DAMAGE DATA
1. INFt,IOHT COLt, IlION KIN|MATICI AT INITANT OF IMPACT
• AIREPEED AT IMPACT (KnomI
• WIND VEt,OGITY AT IMPACT (/[Roll)
• FLIGHT PATH ANGt,E (Dim)
Ou, r%o_
• OIITACt,E IDENTITY AND t,OCATION
OE_'ACLE
(1) r-lminol
|2) ["[AIRCRAFT
II)
It. OIITACI.! ITRIKI IIOUINCI
OWl HIII¢AI;ll
(4) OVlNI_;_.EE
OTntl
IE) C]OTMER
COt,t,lilON HE IGHT AIDVI
(1) OPmoPmOTOll
¢2) [']mOTOR MAST
(3) OTA* t, ROTOR
i4) ['_TAI t, lOOM
(3) r]WIN0mCIqEEN!
CANOPY
GROUND (Feet)
(I) J"Jt,Wm NIle/GUN TURRET
(?) fTLANDING GEAR
(I) r]WING
(11) ['_EMFI NNAGE
(10) • r'_OTHEll (Ejmcf/_)
I_ VERTICAt, SPEED (.l'eetllGr mbtul_)
nup O_
dL WIND DIRECTION AT IMPACT (J[MII'IN'm)
f. INFt,IGHT ATTITUDE AT IMPACT
oEan.E___ nup O00WN DEORE.__ 13- OR
OIITACU! CONII_ICUITY (IrltkM i dklJ_l rrm_ idloll j_wl-
!_ _i_b in Jm _m'mundJ_m _ ebulmd)
(1) {'IcoMFI,.ETEt,y i2) rlpARTIAt,t,Y 13| F1NOT OmlCURED
_, WiRE OR CAILE OllCRIIrrlON
TYPE
(1) _R TRANIMIEION
(3) "Irlt,EFNONI OR TV
($| IIRACINO (fiuTRuFIHX't)
¢4) OTHER RJm'l/_)
OIA IN INCN|E NO. IrrRucK
(El WiRE PROTECTION lYlTIM INrrALI.ID rlyll lING
_IRRAIN COt,t,lllON KINEMATI _1 AT INSTANT OF MAJOR INIIACT
• OROUND EPEEO AT IMPACT (1111o11)
_. FuoHT FATNANat,! r_.-J
Ou, Ooo_
• 114tPACT ANGt,E (_FINm)
viprrlc-I. PIED (Fill Ira" slmlll)
n_. noow.
d. INDICATE IV CHECK MARKS WHICH TWO OF THE THREE PRE-
CIrEDINO PARAMETERE _, b e) ARE THE M0gT ACCURATE
• 0 _.0 ..0
f. ATTITUI_[ AT MAJOR IMFACT
II_ YAI
IIMII
OEaRUE OU_ O00W_ oean.s __ C]UU_T Onla_rr
_. ROTATION AFTER MAJOR IMPACT
, • DID AIRCRAFT nOTATE AIOUT ANY AXIE AFTEM TIdE AIOV! MAJOM IMPACT (it _ eom_b t_ llma b. e. end d)
r'lvE s ['1NO r']UNKNOWN
LEFT (lIGHT
OIORE|I __OLIFT OMIGN1
_"'---...,,_...__ ROT ATI O NS
_"----...,_dqrmm )
AIRCRAFT AXle
, b. ROLL
• YAW
& FOE(WARD NIle OVER fDqrlINg)
IMPAir FoRCEE REt,ATIVE TO AIRCRAFT AXES _)
• VIRTICAL_) t. t,ONGITUDINAL _
O UP O DOWN O FOME O AFT
S. REPORT NUMBER:
m
¢ LATERAt, (O'm)
Ot,.T OMIOHT
WODIFIED FORM6-R, Page 1
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7. FUSELAGE INWARD OEFORMATION ON COLLAPSE AND INJURY REt.ATIONEHIP (C_¢k UFmffNaM k)BeB)
FUSELAGE AMEA
|PECIFIC AREA OF O|FOHMATION
AMOUNT OR TYPE OR COLLAPI,
OF OIFORMATION
,.wet.d Mid I CamillaOff COLLAII_E ¢4_kptt C4i_ln A_kl Cll_tn Aqm I11
ql) (E) (31 (4)
• NOOF
b. dPT IIOl[
• RIGHT JIBE
4. NOSE
• P t.OO Iq
f. FLOOR. (£_.d
deflnNao, erode
m)
UP TO 1 FOOT
I ALONE THAN 1 FOOT
LEB8 THAN 3 FEET
MORE THAN 3 FEET
UP TO 1 FOOT
MORE TMAN 1 FOOT
UP TO 1 FOOT
MORE THAN 1 FOOT
UP TO 1 FOOT
MOllie THAN 1 FOOl +
tJP TO I FOOT
MORE THAN 1 FOOT
VERTICAL
II OBWARO
PO_
t, Am_m COMPONENT OIBPLACEMmNT fC_ff _Fqr'b*" k*:_/
COMPONENT
• TRANSMIIBION (Jrmllm_ m' mldn)
TNANBMlesl ON fl_4ir)
L PtOTOIq BLAB! (jr_ oF indn@
4. ROTOR Ol,.AOl (J14_)
k LANDING GEAR _Wlt_ kMIIf4w)
f. OTHER fllpedp/)
OI$PLACEO
(1)
TORN PREE
(2)
(IS) F USEI.AGE DEFORMATION
PIqOOUCEO/CONTIqlBt, YTEO TO INJUNY
P re'wit iI Mid NW
¢OCkDkl ¢liln Am ¢lb_ Am C4b|n Ar4m
PENETRATED/ENTERED
COCKPIT CABIN
131 141
I. I_I_TG_AIN F LAyMAILE P LUIO |PILLAGE
• EQUIPPED WITH CRAIHWORTH_ b. IF EO EQUIPPED 010 BREAK- !e. AMOUNT AND TYPE FLUID iPlLdO {¢_ll_i lit)
pull svsT.* AWAY VALVESSEPARATE
n v. n NO *-I YeS O mO
• o*o F_uu.,- FUEL * W*_ Am¢.. EOUIPPEO
PIL_OE occur WITH Free RES+TANT
NYO.UUC PLUIO
I'1 YeS (] NO (] y_ I"1 No
OA LLONB ENGINE PUll,. OIL HYDRAULIC PUIO
• -- 1
1 - t
2- 10
110 -- _0
1. IIIILI,,,AOE SOURCE
PART PART NAME, TITLE, NOMINCt.ATURE MANUPAGTURERE NO. NEN
(1) ¢E Lt.rrANK/NEIERVOIR
l "j) FILTER
O1 +IT'rING
(4) PLUIO LINE
]) VALVE
ill) IREAKAWAY VALVE
17) OTNER ¢sjm._r_)
10. REMARKS
11. REPORT NUHBER:
HODIFIED FORM 6-R, Page 2
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TECHNICAL REPORT OF HELICOPTER ACCIDENT
PERSONAL DATA
mOLe OF THIS ,NOIVIOUAL
i: COMMITTED ERRORS THAT CAI_JED/CONTRISUTEO TO _ AT CONTRO_ WHEN ACCIDENT
ACCIDENT OCCURRED
(1) E]DEFINITE LY {3) [']NO (1) _-_YES
(2) r_SUSFSCTE O (&) 1"7 UN KNOWN
(=)DNO
¢. DUTY STATUS
(11 _]ON DUTY
(2)_']OFF DUTY
2. BACKGROUND DATA
b. - .......................
c. HOURI lLEIrt lAST 24 HOURS
CL HOURi ILEl_lr lAST 4E HOUR8
L HOURS SLEl_r LAST 72 HOURS
#. HOURS AWAKE PRIOR TO ACCIDENT
• HOURi DURATION lAST SLEEP PERIOD
h. HOURS WORKED LAST 24 HOURI
L HOURS WORKSD LAST 48 HOURS
3.
@. .......... _ .......
** WAIVERS
DYEs BNO
• FAC
,0 =0 =OI
f. ARL
,O =0 _ 0 amm_
k. MO6T RICIENT EVALUATION FLIGHT IN MIIHAP
_ros AIRCRAFT mC_ont4s S; nr._)
,.HVG OUAUFIED
Or. ONO
,_,,[] siPO ,p,[]
MT, n vT []
n. PRIMARY AIRCRAFT MT06
4,
TYPE EXPERIENCE AND TIME
V I. HOURS WORKED LAST 72 HOURS
_ _ k. DUTY HOURS REMAINING THIS DAY AFTER
ACCIDENT OCCURRED
I. HEIGHT (Inchee)
m. MIGI4T (Poemd_)
ft. AGE
o. HOURS FLOqNN t,&ST 24 HOURS
p. HOURS FLOWN LAST 48 HOURS
q. HOURS FLOIqflM LAST 7 _' HOURS
CREWMEMSER DATA
X O. MT_ AIRCRAFT FLOWN LAST S0 DAYS ASP/IP
p. ivr1"o_ AIRCRAFT OUALIFIEO/CURRENT IN
q. ATM T_I_K NUMSSR A_OCtATED WITH INITIAL
INDICATION OF EMERGENCY
(_) LAST F|RFOnMEO m (n_o. _A_ $ ;._)
(2} NUMSER OF ITERATIONS
t. ATM TASK NUMIER INVOLVED IN RESPONSE TO
IMERGENCY
(,I _ST FERPORMEOm (_7o._ _/_2
_) NUMSERoF ITERATIONS
• FOST-ACCIO|NT FLIGHT i (' YR.", .V_ >
RESULT
t. POST*ACCIDENT MEDICAL SXAMINATION/AUTOPSY
RSOUIREO [.AI TESTS ACCOMPLISHSO
Or. ONO
u. LOW PRESSURE/HIGH ALTITUDE CHAMBER
Ovo ONO
SJECTION SYSTEM DUAL rTYES [_NO
HEATHER
TOTAL
INST
FLYINO EXPERIENCE
FIXED WING ROTARY WING
iINGL ENG MULTI ENG IINGL ENG I MULTI EFdG
& iNITRUCTON PILOT
b. PILOT
¢. COPILOT
d. CIVILIAN PILOT
L TOTAL TIME
f. COMSAT TIMS
• F LT SIMUL/llYNTH TRAINS R .
It, TOTAL TIME LAST :)0 DAYS
L TOTAL TIME LArr SO DAYS
MONTHLY FLIGHT HOURI P_IJ_T 12 MONTH_
(_)_
,:,.oo- I--I-i-I
5. REPORTNUMBER:
fill::! _:/ i :_¸ 1,1: ¸¸¸¸ i
(1)
(2)
(3)
(_)
(2)
(3)
MISHAP AIRCRAFT
DESIGN SERIES
r-
MODIFIED FORM B-R, Page 1
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7. MAINTENANCE ANDEUPPOMT PEMSONNEL DATA
l& PMOe I
(2} SOURCE
[30JT OAIT
r-lc.v..EXP FluNK
II_IMOI I
{1| OATE AWAMDSD (|) SOURCE
m (mo,_r_s sJw_ DOJT [-IAIT
OCIVlL EXP QUNK
¢. DM06 I
d, DEFICIENT TAJi;K NO. I
(v) OM06 Me _TSO [.']YES I--INo
_:]TASx,NTIRR_'TEOoR DELAYED
QvSE ONO
i. MOI VEMIFICATION
mEaT rlao I'INo ao
|2) OlPIN! TAlK PEMFOMMANCE
r']COMMICT F] INCOMMECT [_NA
(3] PEMCSNT DO ON ECOMEAIILE UNITII %
(4) OVEMALL pIIMCENTII.E __%
|i] EQT WAIVEMEO (-]Y|S [_NO
f. CIVILIAN JOB SERIES OM TITLE
,)TASXME_TeD TOJoinO-SOM,.ION
r'lyE i I_JNO
(2| PEMFQIRMANCE ETANOAM_ FOR TASK
r'IvES ONO
&
TYPE TEET
I. CAMION MONOXlDI
I_ ALCOHOL
I. OMIJ_ ICMEIN
d. OTHER
9.
OIAGNOIII
10. M! MAIIli_l
LAIIOMATOM Y TEE "111
SPECIMEN TEIITED MIIULTI NAME OF DRUG
L._...N,f.._,'_ ........................................
NIITORY OF OEIEAEI[S/D|PECTS
METI.IOD OF OIBCOVERY WAIVERS
ANt. lICK At.r1"- OTNEIq Af_rTN
PNY GALL OPEY
J
X
II. REPORT NUMBER:
MODIFIED FORM 8-R, Page 2
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TECHNICAL REPORT OF HELICOPTER ACCIDENT
INJURY/0CCUPATIONAL ILLNESS DATA
• I--Ill ATA L
I_ r'IpEAMANENT TOTAL OIEAelLITY
c. r'_IqEIqMANENT PANTIAL DllAliLITY
DEGREE OF INJUNY
_L r_L0mT WORKDAY CAll (J_we mwey /_Qm wont) II- [_PlIqET A;D ONLY
Ik r'lLOeT WORKDAYS (J)e_m of mltllcMd woPib acduity)
f. I'INON_ATAL WITHOUT LOST WORKOA_I h. E]MIIIIINO • P_IESUMED DEAD
& OA_AWAY PMOMtNOmK
3. UNCONSCIOUS
• Hlql lb. MIN
i
&
:INJURY
llODY AIIPECT
REGION
I I I
NUMEEIq OF L_T WONKOAYII
J i_ OAY8 HOEPITALIZEO I c. DAY8 IqEITNIC'l'lO ACTIVITY
4. AMNESIA
• J'-]RETNOCRAOE: MRS MIN Jb. j'-jANTEOIqADE: Nlq_ MIN ,_¢"_]NONE
INJUNIE$
INJURIES FOIq
UIAIC
_I(_(_Y PION INJURY U_E
TYPE SEVERITY (IVe_/i_d
QUJI_/I_IIP N|EULT (_lllr) ACTION OIiJ_UI_IMIq liUEIJllC*f ACTION [][IJ_UPlEMI mr)
d. a_ f. • h. I. L k. I, m.
I I I I J I I I [
! I I I 1 I ! I I I ! I
I I I I I I I I i I I I
II I I I I I i i I I !
II 1 I II I i I I ] I
I I I I II i I I I 1 I
L llEMAIqK| (U*I dIUlionel I_t_e! if .Iqli_ld)
?. AUTOPSY PEMFOf liMED
• l'Iyz,,, b.E]NO
L CAUIIE OF DEATH
9. REPORT NUMBER:
"MODIFIED FORM 9-R
r.I-1pROTOCOL ATTACHEO
I, DUTYITATUS
d. [-_WILL BE PoIqwAIqO|O
• r-IoNDUTY b.r'lOFF DUTY
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TECHNICAL REPORT OF HELICOPTER ACCIDENT
PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE/ESCAPE/SURVIVAL/RESCUE DATA
1. OlD THIE INDIVIDUA& IUITAIN AN INJURY OR OCCUPA?IONAL II,l,NE_ EECAUSE OF ACCIDENT OYEE END
ITEM
• HE l,MUT
VISOR
GLAEIES
UL PI,IONT EUIT
• PLIGHT QI.OVES
, ,LIGHTJACKET
r* Eoo.h. OTHERCLOTH,NG
L LAP lILT
). SHOULDER HARNE_I
k. GUNNER HARNE_I
I. INERTIA REEl,
m. SEAT/LIt"rE R
h. SURVIVAl, EQUIP
l.
p.
3. I_ RSONNE L EVACUATION/ESCAPE
PEREONNEI, PROTECTIvE/REITRAINT/IURVIVA/EQUIPMENT
• METHOD OF ESCAPE
I=. LOCATION IN AIRCRAFT
• EXIT ATTEMIq'ED
,* EXIT USED
• AIRCRAFT ATTITUDE DURING ESCAPE
f, ¢OCKPITICA, EIN CONDITIO4_IS
• IECAP! OIPFICULTIEI
f l. I.AIIIID TIME FOR RESCUE
& NOTIFICATION OF REECUE PERSONNEl.
b. INOIV PHYSICALLY REACHED
¢. INOIV ACTUALLY ABOARD REECUE VEH
d. RESCUE COMPLETED/AEANDONED
IL Iq[ REONNE t. |UR V | V A _./FI||CUE
• |URVIVAl, PROILEIdl ENCOUNTERED
b. MEANE UeED TO LOCATE INDIVIDUAL
c. RESCUE EQUIPMENT USED
d. PACTORS THAT HELPED REECUE
• FACTORE COMPLICATING RESCUE
f. INDIVIDUAl, PHY|ICA b CONDITION
I-v..l, ,Roouc,RE. RE.,UNC.i
• r A'II_" [ " lO, As,- INFORMATIONTYPE Q ED NIEOEC UEED LOWED I/ENTED! DUCED T ONEO
INJURY INJURY INJURY All DE. CODES
EIGNED
(1) (2) (3) (4l (S) (El (7) (El (St (101
I_ VEHICt.SE ACTUALLY PERFORMtNCi EVAC fSIN¢IfT)
h. OTHER VEHICLE AISIETING IN RESCUE (EJkr¢|lPy)
7. REMARKS full Idd/_ IANI, ll' rlqub'ld)
HOUR OF DAY
HR MIN
LAPEl O TIME
HR MIN
il .., ,j
INFORMATION CODES
ti
,., ;, .
& DIETANCE PROM ACCIDENT TO ACTUAL
RIICUE VEHICLE AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
S. TO AIRCRAPT IN NAUTICAL MILES
Ill. TO GROUND VEHIC III IN STATUTE MILES
INFORMATION CODES
8. REPORT NUMBER:
MODIFIED FORM IO-R
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1.
OEFINITE D II.
2.
INITIAL
INDIC OP
EMERG
• OCLEAR
b. (;r)SCAT'rERED t feet
¢. _)IROKIN ( feet)
_. _OVERCAST ( feet
• --X PARTIAL OSSCURATION
l, X OESCURATION
x. UN KNOV/N
HORIZON
b. PARTIALLY OSSCUREO
¢. OBSCURED
& VISlIILITY (NelLt. m|_l)
S. OBSTRUCTION TO VISION
ACCIDENT SEQUENCE
ACCI D-
AT EM- DURING ENT OR
ERISENC'_ DESCENT TERIdA-
TION
• NATURAL
01, DUST
02. FOG
O0. GROUND FOG
04. HAZE
O6. ICE FOG
Oe. SMOKE
07. SLOWING DUST
0_, BLOWING SAND
08. SLOWING SNOW
00. NONE
ira. OTHER mperf/_ )
b. INDUCEO (Rotorlwmh. lib.)
01. nLOVVl NO SNOW
02. SLOWING SAND
03. SLOINING DUST
04. SLO_NING SPRAY
00. NONE
SB. OTHER fSpeC|fy)
TECHNICAL REPORT OF HELICOPTER ACCIDENT
WEATHER DATA
.DL,o, WEATHER
Ib-SUSPECTED sl i°'NONE
OENERALDATATT,.E o; OCCURRENCE
I I"ALTIMETERSETTINOr'O, I
,. A,RCRAFTICING
NONE 0 I--_
YES 1 r'l
w I Id, UNDETERMINED
¢. ALTIMETER READING (Fe, t)
01. MAIN MOTOR BLADES
0_. WINGS
03. PROPELLERS
04. CONTROL SURFACES
015. ROTOR HEAD
N. TAIL ROTOR
07. F USE LADE
01. PITOT STATIC SYSTEM
0S. CARSUREYOR
10. ENGINE AIR INLET
11. IKUEL VENT8
1_) ANTENNA
lS. WINDSCREEN
Sle. OTHER fEpeclf?)
S. SIGNIFICANT WEATHER
(A mlmlmum Of thin mlw lilt
_lecNd)
01. NAIL
IOQ. ELEET
OS. ItS CR YSTALS
OS. DRIZZLE
07. RAIN
0J. SNOW
12. LIGHTNING
13. THUNDER STORM
14. FREEZING DRIZZLE
lS. FREEZING RAIN
18. GUSTY WINDS
97. UNKNO_NN
00. NONE
_l. OTHER (EpGclfy)
ICING SEVERITY
zl
I
TRACE LIGHT MOO- SEVERE
ERATE
(II (2) (3} (4)
ACCIDENT iSOUENOE
&T SKIER- DURING
GENCY _ENT
WINOS
• ALOFT (At#nmte Idt/hmik)
(11 DIRECTION (Dflr_el MaE.J
b. SURFACE WINOS
I(21 VELOCITY (Ktl
(1) LANDING DIN. (D4rEmel MIMI,) (|) SURFACE WIND OlR, AND
VARIANC II (DE m Nil/.)
(3) SURFAC E WIND VELOCITY AND GUST SPREAD (l_t)
INITIAL
INOIC O41
EMERG
tO. TURSULENCE
NONE 0 [] (if "YES" enlmr II,eloli, "'C'" _or eont/nuoul. "'J" for
YES 1 O bs,_rmltt,_t, lnd *'O" fo, ot_ton_)
L LIGHT
b. MODERATE
c. SEVERE
d. EXTREME
11. FORECAST
CORRECT C _ INCORRECT I _) UNKNOW'N U I_
ACCIO-
E NT OR
TERM-
INATION
1_ RE MAR KS (U_ _difl_ _lt If required)
13. REPORT NUNBER:
MODIFIED FORM ll-R
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TECHNICAL REPORT OF HELICOPTER ACCIDENT
FIRE DATA
1. FIME •TARTEC fC*'ik4ec"JkD -- DefbtIM 8 -- Em_eelmd)
• INIm I.I OHT
b. UPON IMPACT (L4II _ J rain•N)
c. UPON IMPACT' (Mm'e _4m I mblum)
d. DURING REFUELING
O • 4. IGNITIOn4 •OUNCE (Cmqflrlwed)
J. EHORT CIRCUIT
k. LIGHTNING
I. STATIC ELECTRICITY
m. OTHER (EIN_lf_)
y. 0THI[R (EJN'ef/_)
i. UNOETEMMINED r_ 8.
2. INDICATIONE OF FIRE (Morn _ I Nrl _piy, _MY i, • or .I to allow
_qL,4nCe)
• I--IFIME WARNING •YSTEM & ["kIMELL
b. f--IOTHER INlrTMUMENTE e. [-_EXPLOSION (iound)
¢. _EIGHT f. [']EXTERNAL CORM•
y. I--IoTNI[M _'_t/'a'l
3* iNITIAL AND PRINCIPAL LOCATION OF FIRE (Inks" I tO dndiel_
n. UNDETI[RMINED [_
COM•I,.mTI i LE MATERIAL
IL MAIN FUEL
b. AUXILIARY FUEL
e. HYDRAULIC FLUID
d. ENGINE OIL
• TMANiMI•81ON OII.
f. ELE_I'RI_L INEUIATION
!" ACOUSTICAL MATERIAI..I
Mldel I_tkm. ,I to b*di_lw p_ll_J l_mti_m)
Q1. ENGINE ll (_1"1 ON
IE_L TMANIMIIIION SECTION
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